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Introduction  
 
The question – what is to be done about law and order? – set in motion an important 
transformation in criminology in an earlier era (Lea and Young 1984). Questions 
about how policing should be conducted and how the police service can be improved 
confront the discipline again as the second decade of the 21
st
 century draws to a close. 
But what a difference an era makes! When critical criminologists asked what was to 
be done in the 1980s, some lamented that the problems of crime and victimisation in 
poor communities were not taken seriously enough and that the police were ‘losing 
the fight against crime’ (Kinsey, Lea and Young 1986). Others were critical of the 
drift towards law, order and the authoritarian state and rejected the contention that the 
police were the solution to the crime problem (Scraton, 1987). We do not intend to 
rehearse these older debates here, but it would do to acknowledge them, to forestall 
the problem of chronocentrism in our understanding of criminology (Rock, 2005) and 
to tackle head-on new theories of policing which suggest that ‘the police’ have been 
superseded as objects of enquiry by a more diffuse notion of ‘policing’ (Reiner, 
2010). 
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David Bayley (1985) evocatively expressed the relationship between the state and the 
body of men and women charged with exercising authority on its behalf:  ‘the police 
are to government as the edge is to the knife’.  Although ‘all that is policing does not 
lie with police’ (Reiner, 2000, p. xi) and under transnational conditions the state has 
become a different kind of institution than was contemplated by the architects of the 
modern police, there is good reason to take ‘the police’ seriously as an idea.  The 
police, in one form or another, exist in every country and are an important aspect of a 
much broader apparatus of social control.  What makes the police particularly 
important is their capacity to use force in social ordering. This chapter seeks to ask 
how we can improve the quality of policing and make the police accountable to the 
people that they serve.   
 
The challenge set for us by the editors of this volume was to answer the question: 
what is to be done about the police? This deceptively succinct question begs a series 
of theoretical and normative questions concerned with what policing is, who should 
do it, how it should be done, how its fairness and effectiveness should be evaluated 
and how it should be made accountable. In order to address these normative enquiries 
and to focus our arguments about what is to be done, we draw on theoretical and 
empirical police research and set out to answer six sets of questions.  
 
Our first concern is the function of the police. We ask: what is policing and what do 
the police do? Before we can offer a prescription for we think that the police should 
do, we must consider the claims made about the role of the police and the research 
evidence on what day-to-day policework actually consists of. This leads to our second 
question: who carries out the policing function? The public police are most prominent 
in discussions about order maintenance, crime investigation and control, but there is 
competition from private policing and various other providers of security. The so-
called pluralisation of policing raises questions about the place of ‘the police’ in 
social ordering. We turn next to the ways and means of policing. Controversy has 
raged for decades about police powers and, in particular, the use of force and 
‘intelligence-led’ methods including, but not limited to, electronic surveillance and 
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undercover policework. This generates our third question: what powers do the police 
have?  
 
Our fourth set of questions are concerned with how the police achieve in their overall 
social function, how well they do it and at what cost? Do the police successfully 
maintain order and control crime? And at what social and economic cost is this 
achieved? In short we ask: what is ‘good policing’ and how can it be achieved? Our 
fifth concern relates to the evidence that police powers have differential effects for 
different groups in society. The young, the poor, women, and ethnic minorities are 
more likely to suffer the ill effects of policing such as being stopped, searched and 
arrested. These same groups are less likely to feel properly protected by the police. 
We ask: how does policing impact on different social groups? With police 
accountability, under close scrutiny, current debates focus on the relations between 
police and public; this leads to our sixth question: how are the police policed? Finally, 
in our conclusion, we bring the strands or our analysis together to ask: what is to be 
done about the police? 
 
1. What do the police do?  
 
The question – what is the police role? – has been at the centre of debate in the 
sociology of policing ever since empirical research on police began in the early 1960s 
in both the USA and UK.
1
 The backdrop to the interpretation of early empirical 
research on the police role was evident in media representations and in popular 
discourse that framed them as crime fighters in the dominant cultural imaginary of 
cops ‘n robbers. The alternative to this rather constricted conception of the police was 
a radical Marxist analysis of the police as repressive agents of the capitalist State.  
According to this view, the police exercised overt class repression and capitalist 
injustice was disguised by reductive visions of the police mission as suppression of 
routine street crime. Leaving aside the definitional issues concerning the core concept 
                                                          
1
 There had been a single precursor, the seminal empirical research conducted by William Westley in 
the late 1940s, but only published in a couple of journal articles until a belated book in 1970. It was a 
crucial influence on the early 1960s researchers (Reiner 2015). 
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of ‘crime’ it seems reasonably clear that law ’n order, and cops ‘n robbers 
mythologies have been common to both fans and critics of the police. Empirical 
research findings about police work in practice revealed the shortcomings of these 
popular understandings. 
 
Observation of police patrol work, still the mainstay of urban policing around the 
world, showed that the police routinely ‘under-enforce’ the law.  Michael Banton 
showed this in his pioneering ethnographic research in the UK and the USA (Banton 
1964). According to him the predominant role of the patrol officer was peacekeeping 
not law enforcement. This was subsequently confirmed by numerous studies. In itself 
this could be interpreted as officers neglecting their duties, taking the easier way out 
and avoiding the rigours of paper work involved in invoking the criminal justice 
process. Numerous studies concerning public demand for policing services confirmed 
that crime calls were only a small part of the policing picture. Most police patrol work 
is concerned with diverse matters including looking for missing people, dealing with 
mentally ill people in distress, with accidents and other social emergencies. As 
Cumming, Cumming and Edell (1965) memorably put it, when people called the cops 
what they wanted was a ‘philosopher, guide and friend’.  The police were basically 
the ‘secret social service’ (Punch 1979). During the 1980s some research showed that 
a significant proportion of police calls for service involved ‘potential crime’ 
(Shapland and Vagg 1988), nonetheless the evidence suggested that the bulk of calls 
were not clearly about crime (Waddington 1993).  
 
This was theorised in an influential analysis of the police function by Egon Bittner 
(1970, 1974). This analysis suggested that, beneath the diversity of problems the 
police are called upon to tackle there lies, not a distinctive social function, but the 
core capacity to use force.  More recently Jean-Paul Brodeur (2010) expanded this 
view by observing a wider set of police coercive powers that are not legally available 
to ordinary citizens. This does not mean that the police typically (or even often) use 
coercion or force to accomplish the resolution of the troubles they respond to. In 
putatively democratic societies, the craft of effective policing is to use the background 
possibility of legitimate coercion so skilfully that it does not need to be foregrounded.  
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Police work remains contradictory.  It is Janus-faced, encompassing both ‘parking 
tickets and class repression’ (Marenin, 1982). Another way of thinking about this is 
through the distinction between the reproduction of general and specific order.  
Policing in the interests of general social order is a general social good.  For example, 
enforcing the rules of the road make the roads safer for all road users and so this is 
policing in the interests of some sense of the general order.  Policing in the interests of 
specific social order is rather opposite.  An example would be policing the social 
order of the shopping mall, which is largely in the interests of the consumptive 
enterprise.  Such fine distinctions and nuanced analysis has been largely absent in 
public politics since New Labour adopted its own brand of crime control rhetoric in 
the 1990s.  The class issue remains pertinent, nonetheless, as many recent causes 
celebres indicate. These range from the fabrication of official accounts of the 1989 
Hillsborough tragedy (and by the same force five years earlier at Orgreave) to the 
abuse of police force during the G20 and other political protests (Greer and 
McLaughlin, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012, Conn 
2015). It has been submerged, however, by a focus on the economics of crime control 
in which all the conceptual and ethical problems of defining crime are simply 
bracketed out and the main task becomes efficient repression.  This marks a profound 
shift in official pronouncements about the police role. 
 
From the foundation of the English police by Robert Peel with the 1829 establishment 
of the London Metropolitan Police, down to the early 1990s, official statements about 
the purpose of policing played down the straightforward crime control element 
(implicitly and sometimes explicitly challenging popular conceptions). In its original 
formulation by Peel and the Commissioners he appointed, Rowan and Mayne, the 
purpose of policing was the prevention of crime, peace-keeping and the preservation 
of ‘public tranquillity’. The latter phrase was revived by Lord Scarman in his Report 
on the Brixton Disorders in 1981 which explicitly prioritized peace-keeping over law 
enforcement. In this conception, public support is crucial for policing, and a broad 
service role is encouraged to facilitate this. Law enforcement and catching criminals 
were explicitly downplayed by Peel and Scarman, both of whom saw these as 
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evidence of failure in the primary police task of peacekeeping, and as potentially 
undermining order by inflaming tensions.    
 
The historical context in which the British police developed is crucial for 
understanding the Peelian statement of purpose. The police had an acutely 
controversial foundation in the teeth of widespread opposition, in and out of 
Parliament. Although a key motive for their creation was safeguarding threats to 
public order, this was downplayed by Peel, in favour of preventing routine property 
crime, in order to get the 1829 Act passed. The prophets of the ‘police science’ of the 
18th century which underpinned Peel’s conception – Patrick Colquhoun, Adam Smith 
and others – saw the police as only a small part of preventing crime: political 
economy and culture were basic to peace-keeping, with police in the institutional 
sense only plugging the gaps. This perspective remained fundamental in official 
enquiries into policing right up to the early 1990s, receiving a major fillip from its 
centrality to the reform agenda stemming from Scarman, and underpinning the unique 
1990 collaboration of the three police professional associations, that produced the 
Operational Policing Review (Joint Consultative Committee, 1990). 
 
Contemporary government pronouncements about the purposes of policing embody a 
substantial shift, following the politicization of law and order in the 1970s, but more 
particularly the embedding of a new consensus on toughness since the early 1990s, as 
neoliberalism became firmly entrenched (Reiner 2007). Thatcher’s Home Secretaries 
had largely mounted a ‘phoney war’ on crime (apart from in the public order arena), 
despite the Leader’s blazing speeches. But real policing policies as well as rhetoric 
toughened up after 1993. The new orthodoxy was made bluntly explicit in the 
Conservative government’s 1993 Police Reform White Paper: ‘The main job of the 
police is to catch criminals’ (Home Office, 1993: s.2.2). This thief-taking priority was 
undercut by the very next sentence: ‘In a typical day, however, only about 18% of 
calls to the police are about crime.’ But from the law and order perspective, this is a 
problem rather than an indication of public demand that is to be respected. The hunt 
was on for identifying ‘extraneous’ tasks from which the police should be liberated, 
although this initially proved abortive. The 2010 Coalition’s ‘Policing in the 21st 
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century’ pays lip service to Peel’s preventive priority, but focuses primarily on 
‘putting the public in the driver’s seat’ in order to cut crime through ‘common sense’ 
policing (Home Office, 2010: 3). In a 2011 speech in the aftermath of the summer 
riots that year, Home Secretary Theresa May emphasised that the test of police 
effectiveness, ‘the sole objective against which they will be judged, the way in which 
communities should be able to hold them to account, is their success in cutting crime’. 
If the point were not made emphatically enough, at three separate points her speech, 
the Home Secretary exhorted the police to be ‘single-minded crime fighters’ (May 
2011). 
 
There is no doubt that a variety of innovative methods have boosted the crime control 
capacity of the police in recent years. It is, of course, vitally important that the police 
can respond effectively to violent and property crimes, conduct thorough 
investigations of those that are reported and bring offenders to justice. Nonetheless, 
this remains only a small part of serious emergency work that the police are called 
upon for by the public. The police are rightly compelled to maintain a significant 
proportion of resources to respond to these, and the popular representation of policing 
as being all about crime (and crime control as being all about the police) is misleading 
and dangerous. It both threatens the effectiveness of emergency service delivery, and 
also places unrealistic expectations of CSI-level crime fighting upon a police force 
that could never deliver that.  
 
At present, most public discussion focuses on the role of the police in crime 
reduction. But, this is a very narrow and distorted view of the police function in terms 
of policing is and should be about, and what the police actually do. We concur with 
Jesse Rubin that the ‘police are occupied with peacekeeping – but preoccupied with 
crime fighting’ (Rubin, 1972 p25; cited by Kleinig 1996 p11). In our view, the first 
thing that should be done about the police is to ensure that people understand that 
policing is not all about crime control. The police are, in fact, an all purpose 
emergency service charged with responding to a wide range of different urgent social 
problems. In our opinion, emergency order maintenance – so-called ‘fire-brigade 
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policing’ – is the true purpose of policework and should be protected from budget 
cuts (Reiner 2012c).  
 
2. Who does policing?  
 
Many agents and agencies can and do perform policing tasks, and always have. 
Policing may be done by professionals employed by the state in an organization with 
an omnibus policing mandate—the archetypal modern idea of the police—or by state 
agencies with primarily other purposes (like the Atomic Energy Authority Police, 
parks constabularies, the British Transport Police, and other ‘hybrid’ policing bodies; 
see Johnston 1992: ch 6). Police may be professionals employed by specialist private 
policing firms (contract security) or security personnel hired by an organization 
whose main business is something else (in-house security). Patrol may be carried out 
by bodies without the full status, powers, equipment or training of the core state 
police, such as Police Community Support Officers. Policing functions may also be 
performed by citizens in a voluntary capacity within state police organizations (like 
the Special Constabulary), in association with the state police (like Neighbourhood 
Watch schemes), or in completely independent bodies (such as the many vigilante 
bodies which have flourished at many times and places). Policing functions may be 
carried out by state bodies with other primary functions, like the army in Northern 
Ireland, or by employees (state or private) as an adjunct of their main job (like 
concierges, bus conductors, or shop assistants, inter alios guarding against theft). 
Policing is also carried out by technology, such as CCTV cameras or listening 
devices. Policing can be designed into the architecture and furniture of streets and 
buildings, as epitomized by Mike Davis’s celebrated example of the bum-proof bench 
(Davis, 1990). It is increasingly carried out by transnational agencies (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012, 2015).  
 
All these policing strategies are proliferating today, even though it is only the state 
agency with the omnibus mandate of order maintenance that is still popularly 
understood by the label ‘the police’. A much-debated question is whether the apparent 
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shift away from state policing towards private, citizen, and transnational forms 
amounts to a fundamental and qualitative transformation (Bayley and Shearing 1996). 
This claim has been subject to cogent critique. Although the personnel employed by 
private security have indeed grown to be more numerous than public constabularies in 
many countries, they were already coming close in the supposed heyday of state 
policing in the post-war decades (Jones and Newburn 2002). 
Moreover part of the increase in private security numbers occurred because 
corporations have increasingly substituted contract for in-house security thus boosting 
the private security employment statistics. More broadly, Jones and Newburn show 
that the growth of private security represents an increasing formalization of social 
control as the number of employees with secondary but still substantial security 
functions (bus and rail conductors and inspectors, park-keepers, roundsmen, etc.) has 
declined sharply. Some forms of citizen auxiliary police like the Special Constabulary 
have declined (Jones and Newburn, 2002), but the introduction and rapid proliferation 
of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) since 2002 indicates the diversity of 
the ‘extended policing family’. The mushrooming of private security performing an 
increasing array of functions, and the internal diversification of state policing, 
certainly are significant developments, but what is debatable is whether they amount 
to a qualitatively new model of policing requiring an entirely new analytic paradigm 
(cf the arguments in Shearing, 2007, Shearing and Stenning 2012 versus Newburn, 
2007, Jones, 2007).  
The state has never had a monopoly of security arrangements (Zedner, 2006), even 
though in stable liberal democracies it has claimed control over legitimate force—but 
there is no evidence that this domination of legitimacy is under challenge. The new 
policing theorists claim that the status and image of private security has been 
transformative and not just because of their quantitative presence. Whilst they are 
certainly more in demand, it is far from clear that they have become viewed more 
positively by the mass of the public. Although for primarily economic reasons it has 
been government policy to develop civilianization and auxiliaries like the PCSOs, 
these do not threaten the hold over the mainstream ‘sworn’ constables in the public 
imagination. Indeed the popular media have regularly reviled PCSOs (‘Blunkett’s 
Bobbies’) and similar initiatives. Whilst there has undoubtedly been a pluralization of 
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policing in recent decades, in neither substance nor symbolism does it amount to 
qualitative transformation.  In our opinion, the public police are, and should remain, 
the lynchpin of state governance.   
 
3. What powers do the police have?  
 
Police officers usually require only the power of persuasion to do a good job. Coaxing 
a suicidal person away from a ledge, escorting a drunk from a bar, asking children 
calmly but firmly to stop disturbing their elderly neighbours can all be achieved with 
good communication skills and the personal and institutional authority vested in the 
police uniform. However, as we have argued above, to do the job the police require 
the power to use ‘non negotiable force’ and the power to intrude into privacy. The 
reason that people ‘call the cops’ (rather than anyone else) is because they have the 
‘capacity and authority to overpower resistance to an attempted solution in the natural 
habitat of the problem’ (Bittner 1970, pp40-41). This raises the question of what 
powers the police should have and how powerful they should be. 
 
The police share a number of features in common with the military (Townsend 1993). 
They are both specialists in the use of force, and are disciplined organisations 
arranged hierarchically in a rank structured bureaucracy.  Both have access to 
armaments of various degrees of lethality, and share similar uniforms, helmets, and 
badges of rank. Both are drilled to march in step and have ‘command and control’ 
systems that guide and manage deployment. The fundamental difference exists 
because democratic policing emphasises minimal force in the maintenance of social 
order, whereas military use of force aims to conquer an enemy by ‘killing people and 
breaking things’ (Dunlap 2001).  
 
The architects of the modern British police emphasised the distinction between 
soldiers and constables. Indeed, the historical origins of the police lie in the public 
opposition to the use of military force in domestic situations – the deployment of the 
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Yeoman at Arms at Saint Peters Fields Manchester in 1819 (the so called Peterloo 
massacre) – is often cited as a significant feature in the development of non-military 
means of responding to riot (Townsend 1993). Key ideas have underscored the 
distinction between police and military forces: the idea of the constable as a ‘citizen 
in uniform’, the doctrine of the ‘minimum use force’, the ‘rule of law’ and the 
subordination of police powers to judicial processes required to collect evidence and 
arrest suspects. These ideas provide legitimacy to the monopoly on the use of force 
granted to the police in maintaining public order and investigating crime. In Britain 
this distinction is underscored by the fact that most police officers are armed only 
with batons (and increasingly Tasers) and do not routinely carry firearms. Elsewhere, 
of course, the routine arming of the police is usually defended on the grounds of 
‘officer protection’. 
 
The police-military boundary is becoming increasingly narrow (McCulloch, 2004) 
and this trend is not limited to the United States, although it is particularly 
pronounced there (Kraska 2001, 2007). Military personnel in many ‘new wars’ – 
ranging from involvement in civil war and intervening in weak, failing and failed 
states – are frequently called upon to undertake constabulary duties in riot control and 
crime investigation. At the same time, the threat of serious public disorder, actual or 
perceived growth in armed criminality and terrorism have led governments to equip 
police forces with heavier armaments and to develop military training and deployment 
programmes. Police officers in special paramilitary units are often virtually 
indistinguishable from soldiers (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007).   
 
Police in Britain rarely shoot people, but when they do the consequences are of course 
far-reaching for the victims and families of those involved as well as for wider 
society. The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes illustrated the capacity of the police 
to act in a quasi-military fashion. Mistaken for a suicide bomber following a botched 
surveillance operation in the wake of the 2005 mass casualty attacks on London, no 
attempt was made to arrest de Menezes who was shot seven times in the head in order 
to prevent any possibility that a device could be detonated. In 2011, the shooting of 
Mark Duggan – who was unarmed at the time he was killed – provoked 
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demonstrations and triggered widespread rioting. In many parts of the world, police 
shootings are much more common than in Britain. In Jamaica, with a population of 
around 2.5 million, around 140 people are killed by the police every year. The 
Brazilian police shoot 2000 people every year. Police violence in the USA shot to 
prominence in 2014 following the shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed teenager, 
in Ferguson, Missouri, which sparked days of rioting. The issue has remained 
prominent with the regular publishing of video film of police shooting unarmed 
civilians. The US government does not collect data on police shootings, but the 
Guardian newspaper launched a project called ‘the counted’ which has a tally of 709 
people shot dead by the police in the USA in the first 9 months of 2015. By contrast, 
in Britain 23 people were shot dead by police the police between 2004 and 2014 
(IPCC 2015, table 2.2).
2 
 In Ontario, Canada, the Special Investigations Unit, which is 
responsible for inquiring into cases of police use of force throughout the province, 
released a report indicating that between 2010 and 2014 police were responsible for 
39 fatal shootings, of which 16 took place in Toronto (a city of over 2 million people) 
(Gillis, 2015). 
 
In much the same way that the police-military distinction rests on restrictions in the 
use of force, the division between police and spies rests on constraints in the use of 
intrusive surveillance. In a similar fashion, the police have also sought to distinguish 
themselves from spies and police services from secret intelligence services. In recent 
years, however, the lines demarcating police from secret intelligence agencies have 
blurred. This can be seen in the rise of ‘intelligence-led policing’ and with it the 
growth of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination capacity in police 
services, the convergence between policing and secret intelligence values in the 
provision of national security (especially in counter terrorism, but in organised crime), 
the growing role of the secret intelligence and security services in ordinary law 
policing and increased use of criminal informers and undercover policing tactics 
                                                          
2 There are, of course, many other deaths in or following contact with the police; this includes those 
caused by ‘less lethal’ weapons such as Tasers, the use of restraints, collisions with vehicles and deaths 
arising when police neglect their duty of care to people in their custody. 
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(Sheptycki, 2003; Innes and Sheptycki, 2004; Sheptycki, 2004; Fyfe and Sheptycki, 
2006). 
 
A number of recent scandals in the UK illustrate the problems arising from these 
forms of policing (Lewis and Evans 2013). For example, the National Public Order 
Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) a 70-strong undercover unit was set up by the Association 
of Chief Police Officers to monitor ‘domestic extremists’, that is: environmental 
activists. In 2010, information about the unit led to the collapse of a trial of six people 
accused of planning political protest activity. An NPOIU officer Mark Kennedy was 
revealed to have spent seven years working undercover as part of the environmental 
protest movement. During this period, he had participated in police operations 
involving 22 countries which involved initiating long-term meaningful friendships 
and engaging in sexual relationships under false pretences. An even more remarkable 
case involves Bob Lambert, a former Special Branch officer with the Metropolitan 
Police Special Demonstrations Squad (SDS) who embarked on a series of long-term 
relationships with women activists (one of whom bore his child) as a way to establish 
a cover story. After these revelations concerning long-term relationships with 
undercover police officers, eight women initiated legal action against the police for 
deception.  An equally troubling set of cases concern the infiltration of social justice 
campaigns relating to deaths in custody or failures of policing such as the Stephen 
Lawrence Family campaign. A series of judge-led public inquiries into the 
management of undercover policing are now underway. 
 
Public debate about police powers has taken a radical shift in recent times as a 
consequence of the so-called “IT revolution” which has been a mixed blessing for 
police agencies (Marx, 2007).  Techno-policing has turned out to be a double-edged 
sword: on the one hand it enhances police power, promises effectiveness, efficiency, 
expeditiousness and the reduction of administrative burdens (Bowling, Marks and 
Murphy 2008). On the other, the infusion of technology is giving rise to an increasing 
sense of insecurity (Ericson, 2007). The shift towards techno-policing should be 
cautiously received.  Luddism is not an option since the history of policing reveals 
these institutions to be at the forefront of many technological shifts (Brodeur, 2010).  
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The coming age of techno-policing, predictive analytics, geo-spatial analysis, 
computer-aided police management (Prox and Griffiths, 2014) should be anchored 
with democratic and community-led police intelligence analysis (Bullock, 2013; 
2014; and Ronn, 2012). 
 
Policing moves with the times, of course. The ‘innovations in policing’ that occurred 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Weatheritt 1986) arising from the introduction of new 
technologies such as motor vehicles, two-way radios, computer aided despatch 
systems, centralised criminal records data bases are now taken for granted by both 
police and public. Similarly, today’s new scientific techniques, data collection devices 
and mathematical analytical procedures are shaping numerous aspects of policing, 
including crime investigation, intelligence analysis and the management of public 
order (Bowling, Marks and Murphy 2008). Such technologies as ‘body worn 
cameras’, personal digital assistants, mobile fingerprint and DNA testing analysis 
devices blur the boundary between evidence collection, evidence testing and 
punishment. These technologies also blur the boundary between the innocent person 
and the suspect since they enable the surveillance of entire populations.  Numerous 
policing processes are being automated and temporally and procedurally compressed. 
This, for Marks, Bowling and Keenan (2016) indicates a move towards an automated 
policing and criminal justice process that is mediated by technology in ways that 
minimises human agency and undercuts due process safeguards.  Few countries have 
been able to ensure the social democratic basis of techno-policing (Reiner, 2012a; 
2012b).  In the United States and Europe there is an observable move towards a 
highly militarized and invasive form of techno-policing (Kraska, 2001, 2007; 
Flyghed, 2005; Fassin, 2013). The façade of community policing has been destroyed 
(Parenti, 2004) and its techniques integrated into a militarised model of policing 
(DeMichele and Kraska 2001).  
 
4. What is good policing and how can it be achieved?  
 
The ‘blue uniformed’ police force is a modern invention (Rawlings 2002). Originally 
policing in England was equated with parish constables, night watchmen, thief takers, 
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the Charlies (the ‘King’s men’ so named after King Charles) and so forth.  The police 
as an established body of state employees, lightly armed men and women paid to 
patrol towns, cities and villages with the goal of maintaining order, preventing and 
investigating crime emerged in the Victorian era. In Britain, traces of the police idea 
can be found in the late eighteenth century, but police forces really only came into 
being across the country during the mid 19
th
 century with the Metropolitan Police Act 
(1829), the Municipal Corporations Act (1835), The Rural Constabulary Act (1839) 
and the County and Borough Police Act (1856).  The extent of geographical 
penetration of the police is not that extensive. For example, work carried out by the 
UK Audit Commission in the 1980s showed that in a British shire force with 2,500 
police officers, once headquarters staff, management, specialists and abstractions 
were accounted for, and the force divided into the four shifts required for 24 hour 
cover, there would only be 125 police on the streets at any one time. Amounting to 
one police officer on patrol for every 18,000 residents. In some places police presence 
is hardly necessary for more or less quiescent social order.  But elsewhere people do 
not see the police as an organisation that can be trusted to be called upon to prevent or 
detect crime, or to help with other emergency situations.  This is especially true in 
contexts where there is deep-rooted social conflict – and call upon other forms of ‘self 
help’ policing. The role of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in policing nationalist 
communities during the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland are but one example among 
many of how non-state paramilitary organisations fill a vacuum in state provision 
(Mulcahey 2005). 
 
Policing is ‘carried out by a diverse array of people and techniques’ and can be found 
in all known societies. The ‘modern idea of police’ is only one of the ways in which 
policing can be conducted (Reiner 2010, p5). As has been noted by generations of 
sociologists and criminologists, everyday social order is maintained, for the most part, 
by ordinary people without police involvement. However, there is a wide range of 
circumstances, especially in advanced modern societies, that authoritative 
intervention from specialists in order maintenance is not only valuable but essential. 
Responding to major accidents and civil emergencies bring this to the fore. Whether 
the incident is a train crash, flood or exploding bomb, police are required to manage 
the closure of streets and transport networks; the investigation of serious and volume 
Comment [JS1]: Need refs here.  
Graham Ellison.  K. McEvoy 
Shearing  
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crime requiring people skilled in evidence collection, analysis and case preparation; 
the protection of infrastructure such as power generation and supply, ports and 
airports, telecommunications. All of these tasks call for well organised state policing 
that can coordinate with other ‘blue light’ organisations such as ambulance and fire 
services. And, as argued above, the police in contemporary society operate as the only 
all-purpose emergency service that is available twenty four hours a day seven days a 
week to respond to a wide range of social problems. 
 
What, then, constitutes good policing? Here we reiterate Reiner’s ‘neo-Rethian’ 
perspective (1985; 2010a: 65). It might seem strange for critical policing scholars to 
draw on the views of Charles Reith, the conservative ‘cop sided’ police historian. We 
reject Reith’s (1956) romanticised view of the emergence of ‘new police’ as an 
unequivocally beneficent institution. However, we do think there is value in Rethian 
principles of policing, derived from those originally formulated by Peel and set out in 
the first General Instructions issued to the police by Rowan and Mayne the first joint 
Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police (Reith 1956: 286-7). These may not ever 
have been realised in practice, but they can be taken as ‘an aspiration for what a 
police force should be like’ (Reiner 2010: 47, emphasis added).  
 
For Peel, peaceful cities rather than the ‘visible activity’ of the police was the 
criterion on which the police should be judged. This emphasises the point made above 
that policing is not only about crime control and it is crucial the police – as an 
institution and as a body of individuals – should be aware of their broader social 
function. In exercising their functions and duties, the police should recognise that 
their ‘existence, actions and behaviour’ are ‘dependent on public approval... and on 
their ability to secure and maintain public respect’. To the extent that policing is 
concerned with crime and disorder, good policework is not founded on the use of 
military force, the threat of severe punishment, or infiltration of criminal groups. 
Rather, it is based on securing public cooperation, bearing in mind that the police are 
only one agency among many public and private bodies that contribute to social 
order.  
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This also relates to principles minimizing governmental use of coercion, surveillance 
and other intrusive measures. Physical force should be used ‘only when the exercise 
of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-
operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and 
to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any 
particular occasion for achieving a police objective’. As Peel’s principles warn, ‘the 
extent to which the cooperation of the public can be secured diminishes 
proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion’. Police 
powers should be used fairly, kept in check and be democratically accountable. The 
police should adhere strictly to executive functions and refrain from ‘even seeming’ 
to usurp the powers of the judiciary in avenging individual or the state or judging guilt 
or punishing the guilty. Preserving public confidence requires ‘not pandering to 
public opinion’ but by demonstrating impartiality, service, independence and by 
offering ‘individual service and friendship to all members the public without regard to 
their wealth or standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and 
by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.’ 
 
The rise of global neo-liberal ideology has had consequences for the way people talk 
about the economics of policing.  In several countries a general pattern has been 
observed whereby the official crime rates have been dropping for some years and yet 
the cost of policing has continued to rise (Boyd et al, 2011; Gascón and Foglesong, 
2010; Leuprecht, 2014; Ruddell and Jones, 2013; Walker and Archbold, 2014, pp. 
248-260).  There are strong political cross-currents dictating that the costs of public 
policing needs to be curtailed while at the same time democratic social forces seek to 
assert more overt control over public policing (Walker and Archbold, 2014).  These 
forces for change within professional policing are occurring at the same time as an 
increasing drift towards enhanced forms of High Policing (Brodeur, 2007; O’Reilly, 
2015) and other forms of political policing, not least in the context of counter-
terrorism (Weisburd, et al, 2009).  These raise complex questions about how the 
quality of policing may be assessed that are at odds with Peelian policing values.   
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In the final decades of the 20
th
 century, policing in most Western democracies moved 
towards predominantly community and problem-oriented approaches (Bayley, 1996).  
Currently changes in the police operating environment are reshaping the internal 
structure and governance of policing and these adaptations are weakening the 
connections between police and public (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
2005; McCulloch. 2002).  Bayley and Nixon (2010) argue that early in the 21
st
 
century, the institutions of policing entered a period of historical discontinuity 
equivalent to that which presaged the rise of modern policing in London in 1829.  It is 
too early to tell if efforts by coalitions of progressive academics (eg Hough et al, 
2010) and police practitioners (eg. Neyroud, 2008) can transcend the historical 
conditions by melding internal methods of police performance management with 
external markers of procedural fairness.   
 
The odds are stacked against this for a number of reasons.  One is declining budgets 
for municipal policing and the rise in the costs of sworn police officers.  Another is 
resistance by police rank-and-file, especially in North America where police unionism 
in urban policing institutions is strong (Police Practice and Research , 2008).  This has 
inhibited innovation and organizational change in many police organizations.   
Increasingly since the 1960s there has been growing resistance to racially biased 
policing that, in the early years of the 21
st
 century, has been exacerbated by 
demographic changes brought about by large-scale transnational migration (Bowling 
et al, 2012).          
 
One possible response to the growing individuation of police officer accountability 
would be the development of a corresponding ‘constabulary ethic’ (Sheptycki, 2007).  
The constabulary ethic stresses the existential position of the individual police agent 
who is first–and-foremost a human being who freely accepts a professional role that 
imparts the responsibility of interfering in people’s conflicts with one another for the 
good of the community as a whole (Sheptycki and O’Rourke-Dicarlo, 2011).  What 
makes this ethic particularly fraught is that, in extremis, police agents may use force 
up to and including deadly force in order to accomplish the goal of social ordering. 
The constabulary ethic demands that society owes all individuals, including but not 
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limited to police officers, a duty of care, just as individuals, including police officers, 
freely accept the responsibilities that go with living in a caring society. Ultimately, 
what is needed is policing that is ‘good enough” since it is ‘unhelpful and unrealistic 
to demand perfect police’ (Bowling, 2007).  
 
5. How does policing impact on different social groups?  
 
For most people, the police are the first point of contact with the criminal justice 
system and with the coercive arm of government more generally. Therefore, their 
impact on different social groups – particularly those most marginalised – feeds into 
inequity in other spheres and can often exacerbate existing inequalities. The impact of 
policing begins from selective police deployment and targeting, for example with the 
‘over-policing’ of neighbourhoods where minority ethnic communities are 
concentrated. This propensity to treat such areas as intrinsically criminal contributes 
to the rate at which people of African, Caribbean and Asian origin are brought into 
contact with the criminal justice system. Such practices contribute to the on-going 
criminalisation of minority communities – the process by which the law is used 
against minorities to demonstrate their criminality through systemic and selective 
targeting and deployment of coercive power (Gordon 1983: 33). This leads to the 
disproportionate rate at which marginalised people come into contact with the 
criminal justice system, through discretionary practices such as stop and search 
targeting young men of minority ethnic communities and the consequent 
disproportionate rates of arrest, conviction and imprisonment. 
 
Concurrent to this process of criminalisation, people from minority communities often 
experience a failure of service provision from the police. They are more likely to be 
treated by the police in a racially abusive manner, and speak of police apathy towards 
them as victims of crime (Bowling and Phillips 2002). Numerous reports indicate that 
the police response to minority ethnic communities as victims has been an 
unwillingness to provide protection, inactivity, and abuse by the police to 
complainants. The way in which policing provision is perceived by ethnic minority 
people is available from survey evidence (Bowling and Phillips 2002: 135). This 
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tends to indicate that ethnic minority satisfaction with the police tends to be much 
lower than that of white respondents. Unsurprisingly, this also affects the propensity 
of minority ethnic communities to cooperate with the police (Bowling and Phillips 
2002: 136). 
 
The failure of the police to provide a fair and equal service to ethnic minorities is 
particularly visible in cases of racist violence (Bowling 1999). Despite a documented 
rise in racially motivated attacks in the through the 1970s and 80s, the general 
consensus was that the police were either indifferent to the concerns of minority 
ethnic people or actively prejudiced. Additionally, the police harassment of minority 
ethnic people often occurs because of their insecurity about their immigration status, 
and those arrested after going to the police for help in cases of domestic violence or 
robbery may be asked to produce their passport, deterring people from seeking police 
protection. Moreover, immigration checks motivated by racial bias will only confirm 
such bias: if minority ethnic people are predominantly questioned about their 
immigration status, more minority ethnic people will be found to be ‘illegal’, thus 
confirming the initial suspicions. The effects of such discriminatory policing have 
been detrimental: not only have the police failed to provide a fair and equal service 
and protection to minority citizens, but it has also criminalised them through selective 
targeting and enforcement of laws against them.  
  
The experiences of women at the hands of the police have also been shaped by 
stereotypes of ‘acceptable’ or ‘conventional’ femininity. The criminal justice system 
tends to mirror everyday stereotypes and assumptions, and the concept of the “guilty 
victim” (Tchaikovsky 1989: 185) (or the woman who has, in some way, invited harm) 
is applied to women, and police attitudes to women are based on conditions of 
“appropriateness” where women may be subject to harsher treatment if they are 
deemed to be behaving “inappropriately.” Police culture, alongside being in many 
ways institutionally racist, is also entrenched in an occupational culture of sexism. 
Domestic violence has traditionally been low on the police list of priorities, possibly 
because convictions in such cases are rare and the attrition rate is high. The police 
tend to collude with male perpetrators of domestic violence, feeling that they should 
not intervene forcefully and disrupt the privacy of families. Worse, repeated incidents 
of domestic violence have been traditionally treated less seriously and as ‘disputes’ or 
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‘nuisances’. Women of colour are particularly vulnerable to the disbelief, blaming, 
and dismissal directed at them not only as women, but as ethnic minority people who 
are stereotyped as criminals, and as women of colour who are sexually stereotyped in 
different ways (Solanke 2009: 733). Women who arrive in the country as 
“dependants” and suffer domestic violence too are put at risk of deportation if they 
approach social services (Sarwar 1989: 48). A lack of response and a refusal to 
prosecute are common to the police response to racist attacks and their historical 
response to domestic violence (Sheptycki, 1991). Where the police have taken 
concerted steps to tackle domestic violence, through multi-agency policing initiatives 
for example, this has come at the cost of stigmatising households as “problem 
families” while continuing to hold that “cultural differences” are reasons for a lack of 
swift and effective police intervention when women call. This is compounded by 
stereotypes of minority ethnic women as having a “higher tolerance” to male violence 
and pain (Southall Black Sisters 1989: 43), or being stereotyped as “submissive”.  
 
The experiences of women of colour are crucial nodal points from which we can 
understand the impact of criminal justice policing on those who face intersecting 
oppressions, or are multiply marginalised (Bowling and Phillips 2002: 50). The 
experience of women of colour then indicates a higher degree of victimisation along 
the lines of race, gender, and class, and qualitatively different concerns when it comes 
to improving police response. Such intersectional discrimination goes beyond mere 
addition, where discrimination is an aggregation of racism and sexism, but rather 
requires an approach that considers how such characteristics interact to produce 
distinct outcomes. For example, the police response to women of colour who are 
victims of domestic violence by seeing them as naturally submissive, tolerant to pain, 
or bound to their cultures is an interaction of misogyny and racism to produce an 
outcome that fails to assist victims rather than mere addition of the racism and sexism 
that minority ethnic women face.  
 
Minimising the differential impact of policing on marginalised people requires a 
broader understanding of what it is that gives rise to structural inequality and 
discrimination in the first place. It is no surprise that those who suffer the most as a 
result of discriminatory policing practices are those who also suffer the most in other 
social spheres. We should turn our attention instead to the sources of economic, 
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social, political and structural inequality and cultural marginalisation. Safe and 
peaceful communities require investment in public services – housing, health, 
education, and employment – that operate in the interests of marginalised and 
vulnerable people. The current economic programme of cuts to services and austerity 
can only exacerbate the conditions of criminalised populations. We should turn away 
from focusing on the enforcement of laws that penalise people for being the products 
of a system deeply rooted in inequality and hurtling towards ever greater inequality. 
 
Good policing, ideally, would primarily provide reliable emergency services and 
assistance. This is not utopian if the infrastructure to alleviate inequality exists 
elsewhere. Cultural change, where prejudice is tackled and treated as a cause rather 
than a consequence of the conditions of marginalised people, is necessary alongside a 
broader agenda of economic and political reform. Exclusionism sustains 
discriminatory practices and reform requires a reorientation and rebalancing of 
decision-making power. It is this exclusionism that is reinforced by cuts to public 
services that disproportionately marginalised communities that will have the greatest 
impact on the poor and widespread xenophobia with the call for tougher immigration 
measures. If we are serious about challenging discriminatory practices in policing, we 
must be serious about tackling their root causes.  
 
Prospects for change come from the possibility that those at the receiving end of the 
sting of ‘total policing’ and ‘law and order’ campaigns may be able to instrumentalise 
their victimisation as a power base, to claim short-term concessions and long-term 
reform in the arena of economic and political equality. Alliances between 
marginalised groups, activists, academics, lawyers and others may provide the basis 
for effective collective action demanding accountability and the fair use of police 
powers, in the light of the failure of law to effect the fundamental changes required. 
While the scope for reform from within representative democracy is limited by the 
exclusion of minorities from politics and a lack of institutional interest, pressure 
groups and extra-parliamentary collectives may succeed by uniting people in their 
shared, if varying, experiences of marginalisation. Achieving both justice and peace 
depend on short-term interventions with a vision of a long-term future for fair and 
accountable policing.  
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6. Who polices the police?  
 
Thinking about police accountability takes us to the first question of political 
philosophy: ‘who will guard the guards?’  Some people, including police officers 
think that the public should trust the police to get on with the job of protecting society 
from dangerous criminals, investigating crime and maintaining public order.  To such 
people mechanisms of accountability might seem a bit like ‘handcuffing the police’. 
Observing Lord Acton’s famous dictum – that ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely’ – we persist in thinking that democratic police 
accountability matters (Beare and Murray, 2007).  
 
Arguments for the necessity for police accountability derive essentially from the 
difficulty in holding power in check. The conundrum stems from the empirically 
observable fact that achieving the goals of policing – the maintenance of peace, order 
and safety in society – routinely involves the use of physical violence, deception and 
intrusion into the private lives of people suspected of committing crime or are 
somehow threatening to the social order. As Kleinig (1996) argues, the exercise of 
state powers, simply because they interfere with fundamental rights of citizens, are 
morally suspect, cannot be taken for granted but must be justified in general and in 
each individual instance in which they are used. Although policing is justified by 
reference to goods it is intended to achieve, it also inevitably places ‘bads’ or burdens 
on particular individuals (Bowling 2007). Policework routinely involves the use of 
force ranging from the persuasion and threat to carry out a search, physical force 
required to conduct an arrest to the use of deadly force in extreme circumstances. 
There should always be some mechanism to ensure that that the ‘evil means’ used by 
the police are used for the ‘good ends’ that they seek to achieve (Kleinig 1996).  
 
Debates about the regulation of law enforcement powers focus on the means by which 
the police can be held to account in two senses (Marshall 1978). The first dimension, 
that could be called answerability, requires that the police are explanatory and 
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cooperative – they can explain what action they have taken, against whom, why and 
with what effect. The second dimension, that could be called control, requires that the 
police are subordinate and obedient to some form of legitimate authority. This means 
that there must be some means by which the use of police powers can in fact be 
constrained to the minimum required and that there is liability and sanction where 
lawful powers are exceed and indeed where there is corruption and incompetence. 
The precise mechanisms through which both senses of police accountability can be 
achieved are a matter of debate and internationally there is considerable variety of 
practice (Goldsmith and Lewis, 2000; Reiner and Spencer 1993).   
 
Police are ‘held to account’ through diverse institutional processes.  Police 
organizations have internal systems of officer accountability.  Due to the powerful 
advances in computing and communications technology in recent years, front-line 
police officers are constantly measured in terms of a variety of key-performance 
indicators.  This accountability is primarily facilitated through technologies such as 
the mobile data terminals in police patrol vehicles, but with the miniaturization of 
computer technology, increasingly officers are being evaluated according to 
performance metrics communicated to them in the palm of their hands.  This internal 
managerial accountability has been enhanced in recent times through mobile camera 
surveillance.  First in police patrol cars and increasingly in the form of ‘body-worn 
cameras’, individual patrol officers are highly scrutinized in terms of their 
occupational performance.  The observations of earlier generations of police 
sociologists – that officer discretion increased as one moved down the hierarchy and 
that front-line officer’s decisions were made under conditions of ‘low visibility’ – are 
no longer true (Wilson, 1968; J. Goldstein, 1960).  Routine technological surveillance 
of police officers has fundamentally changed the conditions of the occupational 
culture. 
 
Police are also held to account through the institutions of law, that is to say, police are 
compelled to give accounts of their activities during court processes and to legislative 
and judicial bodies.  Traditionally this has been done through one branch of law – 
criminal law – but increasingly police are drawing on other branches of law – for 
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example administrative law when undertaking civil proceedings to confiscate 
proceeds of crime.  Law is becoming increasingly complex and so police capacity to 
give accounts in legal terms has increased.  One Canadian study (Malm et al, 2005), 
determined that the amount of police time spent on paper work had increased by a 
factor of ten in the preceding twenty years.  In other words, whereas in the mid-1980s 
it might have taken a police officer an hour and a half to fully process a person for 
driving a vehicle under the influence, by the mid 2000s, that work time had increased 
to around five hours.  Or, to cite another example, at the time of this study the 
empirical evidence suggested the average domestic violence call would take to police 
officers about eight hours to complete, whereas historical cases would typically take 
up about one hour of one officer’s time.  These increases are due to changing legal 
requirements that oblige police officers to give account of their actions (Malm et al, 
2005).   
 
In some jurisdictions civilian institutions have some political policy purview over 
policing and this requires both individual police officers and the organization as a 
whole to give accounts.  For example, in Toronto, there is a civilian review board 
which oversees police policy and there is in Ontario the Special Investigations Unit, a 
civilian agency charge with the power to investigate police wrongdoing.  Although 
relatively rare, some scholars would argue that, at least in the English-speaking world, 
there is an increasing tendency towards institutional arrangements of external 
accountability and review (Goldsmith and Lewis, 2000). In the United Kingdom, 
numerous bodies are responsible for various aspects of police accountability – the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission, locally elected police authorities or 
commissioners, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Parliamentary Committees and so 
forth. 
 
Studies confirm that in the United Kingdom and North America the avenues by which 
police, both as individuals and as institutions, are required to give accounts have 
increased over recent years (Ericson, 2007; Haggerty and Ericson, 1997; Stenning, 
1995).  In addition to the growing power of technical surveillance of police officers at 
work and the increasingly complex legal requirements for police accountability, there 
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is the possibility of criminal prosecutions, disciplinary proceedings and civil actions 
against police officers.  Increasingly, the power of commercial media to expose police 
to scandal and urgency are being amplified by new social media thereby creating yet 
more lines of police accountability (Doyle, 2003).  
 
British police forces have traditionally been highly decentralised and the vestiges of 
that tradition are clearly evident today. With the exception of specialist squads and 
agencies created to carry out particular policing functions – such as serious organised 
crime – there is still no national police force. Policing in England and Wales is 
geographically dispersed to 43 local police forces organised along county or 
metropolitan boundaries headed by a chief constable who answers to an elected 
Policing and Crime Commissioner (PCC).  This latter role was created by the 
coalition government in by the introduction of the Police and Social Responsibility 
Act (2011) which abolished local police authorities. The idea behind the PCCs was to 
bring public voice to policing, to bring local democracy into the way in which 
policing was governed. The PCCs replaced the police authorities that were part of 
local democracy with although they are directly elected, they are not really 
accountable to the Police and Crime Panels that are linked to the local democratic 
institutions. The 2010 Conservative election manifesto promised to make the police 
‘more accountable through oversight by a directly elected individual’, but the increase 
in accountability is highly questionable at best. The average turn out in the 2012 
election was 15% and there were large numbers of spoiled ballot papers. A review by 
the former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Lord Stephens concluded that the 
model had ‘fatal systematic flaws’ and should be discontinued once the existing 
PCCS had served their term. 
 
It can be argued that whether the police are accountable to an elected politician (such 
as PCC) or a combination of elected and appointed persons, police decision-making 
will retain a high degree of autonomy. This is because the common law doctrine, of 
‘constabulary independence’ which states that police constables should be 
‘answerable to the law and the law alone.’ This has been interpreted to mean that 
police decision-making cannot be directed or controlled by any national or local 
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politician or institution. Despite decades of changes in accountability mechanisms, the 
Chief Constable remains sovereign in deciding ‘operational matters’. This, as the 
former president of ACPO puts it, deliberately insulated from political control makes 
the police ‘autonomous professional agents of the law’ means that the public must 
rely on police ‘expertise, judgment and experience in taking professional decisions on 
operational policing’. This perspective raises fundamental questions about how the 
police can be policed and by whom. 
 
Conclusion: what is to be done about the police? 
 
Having worked through a description of police powers, their role, control, impact on 
different social groups and mechanisms for accountability, we turn in our conclusion 
to the question: what is to be done about the police?  What ever else, we have to come 
to terms with the fact that every social order has some kind of formal policing 
mechanism. Policing is both inevitable and inevitably dirty work (Kleinig 1996, 
Reiner 2010a). Civilizing the powers of surveillance, coercion and punishment means 
coming to terms with the police. By way of conclusion we draw from the preceding 
analysis of policing in order to articulate what we think should be done to improve the 
quality of policing and the police. 
 
Our first recommendation is that discussions about policing should shift above and 
beyond the goal of crime reduction; the idea that crime control should be the sole (or 
even main) job of the police has become a political fetish. It is wrong in theory and is 
flatly contradicted by the evidence of what policing consists of in practice. 
Marshalling resources in pursuit of maximal crime control is, in our view, not only 
unproductive but also skews the reality of the policing task. It is worth noting that the 
crimes that are recorded by criminal justice systems tend to be ones committed by the 
disadvantaged against the disadvantaged. The focus on street-crime rather than ‘suite 
crime’ is deeply embedded, and bolstered by the shackling of police powers in private 
space, including mass private property. In our view, we should recognize that the 
police exist primarily as a first line response to people in distress and that the 
‘emergency social service’ role of policing should be paramount.  
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In our understanding the role of the police, we underline the importance of other 
institutions in helping maintain social order and community safety, including the 
family, schools, tenants and residents’ associations, faith groups, private security 
guards, wardens, stewards and a plethora of neighbourhood organisations. The police 
are only one among many public, private and voluntary sector providers of services 
concerned with order maintenance, crime prevention, crime investigation and the 
provision of security. This is a highly plural operating environment that needs police, 
public and government to maximise the potential of these agencies to provide an 
effective, but also fair and democratically accountable social order for all. This also 
requires that we ensure that the police service is comprised of the right people in 
terms of police staffing, leadership and integrity. This is concerned with recruitment, 
retention, promotion of the people who have the right values and are committed to the 
highest quality of service and to the highest integrity. These qualities are not only 
important in relation to public policing, but also because there is a need for leadership 
across the policing sector. 
 
Police powers should operate on the principled basis of minimization, parsimony and 
proportionality. That is, the police should use the least possible coercive force and 
intrusion into privacy to achieve their aims. In all instances, the least intrusive or 
coercive option should be used. The drift towards militarized policing techniques, 
equipment, methods and organisation should to be reversed. The use of covert 
investigative methods is highly problematic; the police should be visible symbols of 
democratic social order. They cannot be if policy and practice are shrouded in secrecy 
and routinely performed at the boundaries of legality and ethical conduct. We need 
more robust accountability mechanisms to regulate ‘high policing’ and intelligence 
led forms of policing such as surveillance, undercover policing and the use of 
informers. Models of assessment and accountability need to be examined thoroughly 
to reflect the reality of plural policing. Evaluations of policing have to take into 
consideration the diverse roles and functions of police. Existing mechanisms for the 
governance of policing are not fit for purpose since they are politicised, yet seemingly 
unable to hold police action properly to account, and they may in fact inflame police-
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community relations. We need a properly democratically accountable and human and 
humane response to the problems of crime and disorder within communities. 
 
The idea of the police as a public service is vitally important in a democratic society 
and should be defended. In a world in which everything is up for sale, the police 
should not be. This is important for a number of reasons, above all the requirement of 
public accountability for the common good. Legal regulation of policing is necessary, 
but not sufficient to bring about real change in how the fundamental goals of policing 
are shaped and moved towards a greater concern with legitimate peacekeeping. To 
create a more diverse and ethical police force, one in which the use of intrusive and 
coercive force is kept to a minimum and which can be held to account to the people it 
serves, requires political and cultural change. Apart from strengthening procedures to 
hold the police accountable, and improving appropriate training and supervision, it is 
worth noting that that those who bear the brunt of the criminal justice system’s 
coercive power are those who are at the margins of society more generally.  
 
Official responses to police wrongdoing or occurrences involving the police abuse of 
force and other problematic policing events should be dealt with by an external 
agency. It is unacceptable for allegations of police misconduct to be investigated by 
the police themselves. Robust external review is a fundamental requirement of police 
accountability. Official policies should be enforced through training, supervision, and 
monitoring that is sensitive to the possible intersecting oppressions that members of 
the public may face, and the unique obstacles that these pose to current policing 
practice. The police should be accountable to the citizenry they serve and policing 
policies need to be monitored so that the emergency social service function can be 
made most effective at the operational level. 
 
Women, people from ethnic minorities, the poor, the mentally ill and the young (and 
the various intersections of experience between these distinct categories) are among 
the most vulnerable members of society, who face political, social, and economic 
marginalisation in every sphere of public and private life. Those that are the most 
marginalised come into contact with the police as a consequence of their marginalised 
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status, and have laws selectively enforced against them, which only serves to entrench 
their marginalisation. As policing evidently impacts those most marginalised the 
most, the drift towards paramilitary policing and the use of broader surveillance that 
undercut safeguards on civil liberties should be reversed.  
 
Understanding why marginalised individuals and communities are disproportionately 
targeted by the police returns us to understanding the police role is in the first place 
and more broadly, what activities are deemed to be objects for crime control. The 
police are the coercive arm of the state and embodying the state’s values and interests. 
If the state embraces neoliberal capitalist values, it will inevitably work in the 
interests of dominant groups of people. Under such conditions, these minorities fall 
outside the values of the dominant class and hence become targets of inappropriate 
policing practice. Policing is ambivalent; its repressive functions reproduce the 
dominant social order and yet the activity of peacekeeping – if it is done well enough 
– can also contribute generally to a beneficent social order. Improving policing is, 
therefore, intrinsically related to refreshing and renewing fundamental democratic 
values. 
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